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Abstract
Internet and mobile users have been using financial institutions’ alternative
channels for their financial transactions with an increasing rate. In order
to avoid frauds, the financial institutions make use of second factor authen-
tication tokens such as one-time passwords sent to mobile phones as text.
Another trend of such transaction verification is utilizing fully cryptographic
protocols, in which the transactions are signed by the users. In the implemen-
tation of such an approach, in order to provide end-to-end security between
the financial institution and its client, each client must have a public-private
key pair. In some cases, especially for small-scale institutions, such a trans-
action verification system is fully outsourced as a Cloud service including
clients’ public keys. However, even in this outsourced model, the institutions
need to access their clients’ public keys for end-to-end security. In such a case,
in order to provide privacy of the clients against the outsourced database,
we need a privacy-preserving public key repository. In this thesis, we devel-
oped such a privacy-preserving public key repository based on Path ORAM
mechanism. We have developed adaptation layers for Path ORAM so that
the queries are performed via regular SQL queries and the data is stored in
iv
a regular relational database, rather than Path ORAM’s non-standard data
structure. In this way, the non-standard features are hidden from both the
financial institutions and the Cloud provider. We analyzed the performance
of our system under different database sizes, network connection models and
query types. We conclude that such a Path ORAM based system is feasible
to be used in a practical system since even with a regular computer used as
a server, the computational overhead is at marginal level.
O¨zet
Internet ve mobil kullanıcıların finansal kurumların alternatif kanallarını kul-
lanımı gittikc¸e artmaktadır. Dolandırıcılıktan korunmak ic¸in finansal kurum-
lar telefonlara kısa mesaj olarak go¨nderilen tek kullanımlık s¸ifreler gibi iki
fakto¨rlu¨ kimlik dog˘rulama yo¨ntemlerini kullanmaktadırlar. I˙s¸lem dog˘rulama
ic¸in kullanılan dig˘er bir yo¨nelim ise is¸lemlerin kullanıcılar tarafından imza-
landıg˘ı kriptografik protokollerdir. Bu tip yaklas¸ımların gerc¸eklenmesinde
mu¨s¸teriler ile finansal kurumlar arasındaki uc¸tan uca gu¨venlig˘i sag˘lamak
adına her mu¨s¸terinin bir ac¸ık-gizli anahtar ikilisine sahip olması gerekir.
O¨zellikle ku¨c¸u¨k o¨lc¸ekli kurumlarda, bu tip bir is¸lem dog˘rulama sistemi ve
ac¸ık anahtarların saklanması Bulut servisi olarak tas¸eron hizmeti olarak
alınabilmektedir. Ancak bu tip bir tas¸eron modelinde bile kurumlar uc¸tan
uca gu¨venlig˘i sag˘lamak ic¸in kullanıcılarının ac¸ık anahtarlarına eris¸mek isteye-
bilirler. Bu nedenle, kullanıcıların mahremiyetlerini tas¸eron veritabanı hizmet
sag˘layıcısına kars¸ı koruyabilmek ic¸in mahremiyeti koruyan ac¸ık anahtar de-
posuna ihtiyac¸ vardır. Bu tezde Path ORAM mekanizmasını kullanan bu tip
bir mahremiyet korumalı ac¸ık anahtar deposu gelis¸tirilmis¸tir. Bu kapsamda
sorguların normal SQL sorguları oldug˘u ve verilerin de Path ORAM’in stan-
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dart dıs¸ı ag˘ac¸ veri yapısı yerine ilis¸kisel veritabanlarında saklandıg˘ı bir du-
rum ic¸in Path ORAM bag˘das¸tırma katmanları gelis¸tirdik. Bo¨ylece standart
dıs¸ı o¨g˘eler hem finansal kurulus¸tan hem de Bulut sag˘layıcıdan saklanmıs¸
oldu. Sistemimizin bas¸arımını deg˘is¸ik veritabanı boyları, bag˘lantı model-
leri ve sorgu tipleri ic¸in analiz ettik. Bunun sonucunda da Path ORAM
tabanlı sistemimizin normal bir bilgisayarın sunucu olarak kullanıldıg˘ı du-
rumda bile marjinal seviyede ek is¸lemsel maliyet getirdig˘ine ve pratik olarak
kullanılabileceg˘ine kanaat getirdik.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Privacy of the Internet users has became one of the most important concerns
as the Internet and mobile usage increase. Privacy in the Internet world is
directly related to data privacy, which is defined as keeping the individuals’
identity, habits, personal information and other critical data immune from
unauthorized disclosure.
User’s shared data such as photos, comments, etc could be considered as
his/her private information. However, there are also some other types of data
that are being used by the users to perform users request which can reveal
some sensitive facts about user’s habits, customs, behavior, or any other
statistical information. Those kind of user data can be abused by malicious
users or even servers. Over the last few years, by developing modern types
of communications as well as faster ever communication equipment, public
database services become more and more widespread. From hotel booking
2services to stock exchange market, public databases are being used in a wide
variety of areas. Hence, users need to send their requests in the form of SQL
queries to those public database servers in order to fetch their requested data.
In some cases, however, users’ queries could be considered as very sensitive
and private user information since it is possible to infer very crucial and
private information about the user and his/her habits. Thus, it is extremely
important to provide privacy of the users’ queries against malicious database
server administrators or any other authorities, which are suspicious to take
advantages of inferred data for their personal benefits.
Keeping users’ queries private against database administrators is con-
sidered as a complex problem, because without accessing user’s query it is not
straightforward for the database server to perform operations to fetch user’s
requested data from database. Furthermore, cryptographic primitives such
as encryption/decryption operations are not proper to be used as a “privacy-
provider” against malicious database servers, although it can be used to keep
information secure form any third parties. Hence, in order to provide user’s
query privacy, we need to take advantage of cryptographic protocols. In the
literature, there are several such protocols, such as PIR (Private Information
Retrieval) [3–5,11,17,20,27,30], OT (Oblivious Transfer) [1,2,7,8,18,19,22,
29], and ORAM (Oblivious RAM) [6,10,12,13,16,26,28,31,34,35].
Among these cryptographic protocols, Path ORAM [9, 36] is the most
appropriate and suitable to be utilized in practical and real-world applica-
tions thanks to its properties which makes it faster and provides acceptable
level of privacy.
3In this thesis, we utilized Path ORAM protocol to adapt it as a “privacy-
preserving” tools in an outsourced database systems to keep users’ data pri-
vate from untrusted database managers in a cloud settings. More specifically,
we utilized Path ORAM in order for a banking system to outsource its cus-
tomer database to the cloud. We developed a model for a middleware to
implement Path ORAM in SQL environment so that query operations are
performed in a transparent manner. Eventually, we evaluate efficiency and
effectiveness of our system in such a banking application setting by develop-
ing a practical software systems.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives the moti-
vation and the problem definition. Chapter 3 reviews some existing crypto-
graphic privacy protocols in the literature. Chapter 4 presents our proposed
adaptation for Path ORAM in a practical setting; mainly for outsourcing the
customer database of a bank to be queried using SQL in a privacy-preserving
manner. Chapter 5 gives details of our implementation and discovers exper-
imental results. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Motivation and Problem
Definition
In recent years, by developing technology, modern types of communications
are being used by most people and enterprises around the world. Nowadays,
by utilizing smart phones and the Internet, we are able to do anything any-
where and faster than ever before. However, those benefits are not without
cost and they bring along several challenges. One of major concerns in any
kind of modern communication methods is privacy and security of users and
their information which are being transferred in the network. These concerns
become more significant in case they are used for more sensitive or critical
purposes such as financial, commercials, military, etc.
Financial and commercial data transactions methods have also being
changed rapidly by appearing cutting-edge communication technologies. De-
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pends on the application, there are wide variety of security and privacy
methods and protocols such as authentication, authorization, confidential-
ity, non-repudiation necessary to be used to ensure that the transactions are
being performed in a safer and reliable way.
For any financial transaction operation in banking system, there are
some security and privacy operations that have to be applied in order to
guarantee users’ security as well as authenticity of that transaction per se.
Utilizing cryptographic protocols can help us to provide security and privacy
which are required to perform those transactions. One of most important
part of any financial transaction is users’ authentication. In other words,
banks need to confirm users’ identity before starting to perform transaction
operations.
In today’s world, financial institutions generally use classical user-
name/password authentication technique with OTP (One-Time-Password)
based second factors. However, this strategy has some disadvantages as will
be discussed in the next subsections. Thus, there is a need for a more securer
and privacy-providing user and transaction authentication and verification
methods, which is our main focus in this thesis.
2.1 Two Factor Authentication Protocol
Two Factor Authentication (TFA) is an authentication protocol, which is
being used in many banking systems as well as other corporations. The
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protocol works based on separate secure communication channel to confirm
sender’s identity. In such protocols, users send their primary authentica-
tion information, such as password, PIN code, along with his/her requested
transaction information, to the bank. Immediately after receiving user’s re-
quest, bank checks for user’s identification information in its database. In
case those information is entered correctly, bank sends a randomly generated
One-Time-Password (OTP) back to the user but this time using separate
communication channel than the first one, such as SMS, email, etc. Subse-
quently, user has a limited amount of time (usually between 1 to 3 minutes)
to resend received OTP back to the bank server using primary communica-
tion channel. If user can successfully send OTP back to the server in the
given period of time, bank will confirm the identity of the user. Finally, in
the next stage bank will perform user’s requested transaction operation. Fig-
ure 2.1 indicates two factor authentication operation steps. Note that OTP
is a randomly generated code and it is allowed to be used just once for any
kind of transaction. Therefore, for each distinct transaction of any user there
should be a unique randomly generated code in order to prevents any abuse
or attack.
Most significant advantage of this OTP based mechanism is that it
prevents possible attacks in the primary communication channel. However,
it still has some vulnerabilities. One of known attacks to this protocol is
message forwarding attack that exists in some platforms and operating sys-
tems such as Android. In message forwarding attack, any received message
to the user is sent to other third party applications (malwares) without user’s
awareness. Therefore, an attacker can use it to get OTP code. Phishing is
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Figure 2.1: A Generic Two Factor Authentication Protocol.
another possible attack. Here, attacker tries to opens its own designed appli-
cation in users device, which is very similar to the bank application in terms
of GUI, to get user’s OTP. Then, attacker asks user to enter his/her received
OTP. As soon as user enters the code, attacker can obtain the OTP then uses
it instead of user. To prevent phishing attack, users must make sure that
he/she is connected to the genuine bank site by verifying the SSL/TLS cer-
tificates before entering their OTP. However, most of the ordinary users have
no technical security knowledge; therefore, it is considered as a big challenge
in this protocol.
Main transactions of all banks are financial operations. Security oper-
ations, specially in small banks could be outsourced. However, outsourced
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operations can cause vulnerabilities in the financial transaction system. For
instance, users’ information and keys may needs to be stored in the out-
sourced database. Because of this reason, is very important, security and
privacy of this method to be addressed.
2.2 Problem Definition and the Main Work-
ing Model
Instead of using OTP based mechanism, employing cryptographic mecha-
nisms (such as digital signature) for transactions verification would improve
the security level of the system in a more positive way. On the other hand,
small banks and companies may prefer not to employ separate servers for
this purpose and prefer to outsource this as a cloud service. Outsourcing of
services such as identification and signature based transaction confirmation
operations means to delegate cryptographic operations to cloud servers. In
such a setting, cloud servers will also keep necessary keys of the customers
so that cryptographic operation can be outsourced as well.
However, using such a cloud-based outsourcing model has its own chal-
lenges; cloud servers may not be completely trusted; therefore, it is essential
to establish end-to-end encrypted communication between banks and cus-
tomers through the cloud. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the steps of operations
in an outsourced cloud-based model.
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Figure 2.2: Transaction operations in an outsourced cloud-based authentica-
tion and transaction verification model (Phase 1).
In this model of authentication and verification, there are two pairs
of key. First key pair (public/private keys) is utilized for end-to-end en-
cryption and decryption between the bank and customers. Second pair is
used to authenticate customers; each customer of the bank has a private key
which is stored in his/her device, while the public keys of all customers are
stored in the outsourced server database. The reason is that, outsourced
server is responsible to perform verification and authentication operations of
the customers during transaction verification process. As indicated in Fig-
ure 2.2, in the first step, customer sends transaction request to the bank
server. Then, bank encrypts customer’s request in such a way that only cor-
responding customer will be able to decrypt it. Then, the bank server sends
encrypted request of the customer to the cloud server to get the customer’s
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authorization on the transaction. Afterwards, cloud server passes encrypted
information to the customer and asks him/her to sign it. At this point, the
customer decrypts received message and checks whether the transaction re-
quest belongs to him/her. After that, he/she signs the received message using
his/her private key and sends it back to the cloud server. As shown in Fig-
ure 2.3, immediately after receiving the signature of the transaction request
from customer, cloud server validates customer’s signature using his/her cor-
responding customer public key. However, the idea here is that the cloud
server should not be able to learn customer’s identity because of his/her
privacy against outsourced server, which is considered as an untrustworthy
server. Owing to the fact that, outsourced servers are not trusted, we need
a privacy-preserving mechanism to let cloud server confirm user’s identity
but without leakage any information about his/her identity. Finally, cloud
server sends the authentication result back to the bank server and bank server
can either perform customer’s transaction request or reject it based on the
verification result.
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Figure 2.3: Transaction operations in an outsourced cloud-based model
(Phase 2).
As it is described above, and shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, the bank is
considered as a client for outsourced cloud server. Therefore, the bank sends
its request to the cloud server in order to perform the authentication and
verification process. However, since outsourced server is not trusted, we need
to keep customer information private. This is considered as a challenging
problem and a hot research topic.
One of the subtopics in this challenging privacy problem is that cloud
server may need to keep the customer database of the bank including the
customer’s public key for end-to-end (bank-to-customer) encryption. The
bank needs to query this database to get the customer public key in order to
encrypt the transaction details. Thus, here it is needed to have a system in
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which both (i) customer data will be kept in a secret way, (ii) bank queries
will not be seen and processed by the cloud in a clear way.
Furthermore, nowadays, almost all database systems are rational database
systems such as MS-SQL Server [21], SQLite [24], mySql [25]. The problem
here is that, however, there is no any built-in mechanism to provide cus-
tomers’ privacy against database server administrator in rational database
systems. Thus, we have to either design an intermediate application to be
placed between rational database server and its users to hide their access
pattern track or devise completely different database system to be deployed
instead of rational database systems.
2.3 The Contribution of this Thesis
In this thesis, we focus on the problem of customer database outsourcing for
a bank to be used in transaction verification model. In this model, the bank
needs to query the customers’ public keys in a secure and privacy preserving
manner. Moreover, due to existing practices of the bank, a rational database
system must be used and the queries must be performed using regular SQL
queries. We adopt on existing privacy preserving data access model, namely
Path ORAM [35,36], for these purposes.
Chapter 3
Background and Literature
Overview
Nowadays, users’ privacy has become a major concern in any aspect of com-
munication networks. In the last few years, by appearing new communication
methods such as cellphones and smart cards, almost all users’ information
are available on the network and opens doors for many types of electronic
crimes. Therefore, it is vital to provide not only security mechanisms but
also privacy. On the other hand, each application or communication model
requires diverse models of privacy-enhancing protocols in order to make sure
that data transactions meet acceptable level of privacy and security. How-
ever, all of those privacy models have a similar goal which is hiding users’
data from untrustworthy access of any third-party except authorized parties.
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3.1 Privacy in Database Systems
There are several studies and researches in academia to provide users’ pri-
vacy in many different communication and networking systems. Thus, hiding
users’ access pattern as well as their requested data from database server is
a specific aspect of users’ privacy which is still a hot topic in academia. Ac-
cordingly, in most of applications, a database system is demanded in server
side to keep users’ or products information in order to perform users’ re-
quested transactions. Since database server is considered as an owner of the
stored data in the database, it can access all data and users access patterns.
However, as we discussed in the previous chapter, in some applications such
as outsourced servers, database administrators are not trusted (considered as
a third-party application). Nevertheless, we need to provide privacy of users’
against untrustworthy database server which is a tough problem in database
systems, as database server needs to access the queries of the users in order to
process them. Furthermore, privacy-providing protocols in database servers
can be categorized into two main categories: (i) utilizing an intermediate
application to provide cryptographic protocol along with existing database
systems, (ii) creation of a new database system with the required crypto-
graphic protocols from scratch and replace it with existing database system.
These two models are shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
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Figure 3.1: Providing user’ privacy with rational database system using in-
termediate application.
Figure 3.2: Database server with built-in privacy protocol.
3.1.1 Utilizing Intermediate Application
Although in the first model which is shown in Figure 3.1, there is no need to
change the database system, it is hard to devise an intermediate application
to interact with both users and database systems since, there are wide variety
of different database systems. Also each specific application has its own com-
munication and data structure policies. Nevertheless, it is very challenging
to design such a generic application which can operate with different kind
of applications. Furthermore, any intermediate application needs to access
database system internal management layers or administrator privilege access
to the data stored in the database, while no database systems allow any third
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party applications to access their internal management layers because of data
integrity, correctness, and security. In addition, benefiting an intermediate
application is costly in term of communication and processing complexities.
Due to the fact that, any data transaction between users and server needs
to be sent and processed in that intermediate application before and after
transaction process in the server side, it will have more processing load as
well as communication cost. Finally, designing and implementation of this
protocol is also challenging, because we need to decide where and how this
intermediate application should be implemented and deployed. Ian Goldberg
et al [30] proposed a method called TransPIR which extends Private Informa-
tion Retrieval (PIR) systems such a way that SQL queries can be privately
evaluated over rational database systems. Figure 3.3 shows functionality of
their proposed method.
Figure 3.3: TransPIR, an intermediate application proposed by [30] to con-
vert PIR to rational database.
In their proposed model an intermediate application (TransPIR) lies
between users and database system. However, as it is shown in the Figure 3.3,
query processor, virtual database, and PIR proxy part of TransPIR protocol
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are located on the client side. As a result, the client side needs to have
powerful communication and computation power in order to perform all those
operations, which is not practically feasible for all applications.
3.1.2 Generating New Database Model
In contrast, second transaction model which is shown in Figure 3.2, needs
to be designed and implemented independently by using cryptographic pro-
tocols. However, this model needs to design all essential functionality of
database system as well. Additionally, abstraction is another important issue
which is very important to be considered in the designation of this protocol.
Abstraction means that, designation, implementation, and deployment of the
database system should be completely separated from each other and should
be hidden from end user of the system. Therefore, end-users of the system
no need to have any detail information of implementation of the system. In
other word, end-users of the system can send their SQL command to the
system and obtain their requested data without any knowledge about the
detail of system implementation.
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3.2 Privacy Protocols Against Untrustworthy
Database Servers
We evaluate three most-addressed cryptographic “privacy-providing” proto-
cols which can be used against untrustworthy database servers. The protocols
are 1) Private Information Retrieval (PIR), 2) Oblivious Transfer (OT), and
3) Oblivious Random Access Memory (ORAM). We have studied most of
previous works and evaluate some of them to evaluate their efficiency in a
real-world application. Hence, following sections are the detailed evaluation
of each aforementioned protocols.
3.3 Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
The goal of PIR is to provide requested data access to the users, without
revealing which data is accessed to the database administrator. Since un-
trustworthy database server can follow user’s queries and infer what data
the user wishing to access. PIR is a one-way cryptographic primitive which
means that it just provides users’ privacy against database server but the
inverse is not provided by this protocol. In other word, user has a privilege
of accessing to all information in the database. In some application which
is being involved with public databases such as hotel and flight booking ser-
vices, it is not considered as a problem if users can access to partial or even
all information in the database since they are stored in public form.
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Very simple and trivial way to achieve PIR is to download entire con-
tents of database from the server therefore server could not infer which data
has been retrieved by the user. Although this method has a high theoretic
privacy level and also it is considered as the ideal way to achieve PIR, it is
not feasible to utilize it in most of practical applications. Due to the fact
that, most of the databases in an actual applications are very huge in size,
besides it is not applicable to transfer that amount of information to the user
in every transaction. In fact, there are two main mechanisms to address PIR
protocol: first one, is to make database server computationally bounded and
second one, is to use multiple non-cooperating database servers such a way
that each of them have a similar copy of data.
3.3.1 Single-Database, Computationally Bounded PIR
According to Claude Shannon [33] theory, a cryptographic protocol is se-
cure if it cannot be broken by even an unlimited computing power. The
first single-database computationally private information retrieval (CPIR)
scheme has been introduced by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [17] in 1997. They
achieved communication complexity of O(n) for any  > 0 in their works
where n is the number of stored bits in the database. In their scheme,
database is an n − bit string x, which user can send index i to obtain the
bit xi while hiding the index i from the database server. Their proposed
scheme security is based on the quadratic residuosity problem. Later, in
reference [3] Christian Cachin, et al. presented a new CPIR scheme based
on poly-logarithmic communication complexity with intractability assump-
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tion called Φ−HidingAssumption (ΦHA). In reference [19] Helger Lipmaa
proposed a new scheme which reduced the communication complexity to
O(l log n+ k log2 n), where l is the length of the strings and k is the security
parameter. This protocol could be used as a CPIR as well due to its lower
communication complexity, although, it is an oblivious transfer protocol. In
reference [11] Craig Gentry, et al. proposed a novel scheme with communi-
cation complexity of O(k + d) where k ≥ log n. n and d are the database
size and the bit-length of the retrieved database block respectively. The sig-
nificance of their work was that, users requested data size was independent
from data retrieving operations. The security of their scheme was based on
simple variant of Φ−HidingAssumption (ΦHA) was introduced by Cachin,
et al. [4]. As indicated by Ostrovsky, et al. [27] the proposed schemes by
Kushilevitz, et al. [17] and Lipmaa [19] use the same ideas based on homo-
morphic encryption. However, the Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky protocols are
based on Goldwasser–Micali cryptosystem while the protocol by Lipmaa is
based on the Damg˚ard–Jurik cryptosystem.
3.3.2 Multiple-Database, Information Theoretic PIR
Information-theoretic PIR protocol, is based on multiple non-cooperating
database servers, each having a similar copy of the same database. Chor et
al [5] introduced the method in the 1995 for the first time. In their scheme
user can access to k databases (k ≥ 2) then he/she can privately retrieve
data stored in the database. In other word each individual database server
which is holding a replicated copy of the same database infer no information
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related to the identity of the item retrieved by the user. In their works, they
presented two-server scheme and and achieved communication complexity
O(n1/3).
3.3.3 Overview of PIR
There are also many other PIR schemes of both single-server and multiple-
server models have been addressed by other researches. Some of new dis-
covered protocols achieved better communication complexity. For instance,
single-server (Computationally private) PIR can be accomplished with con-
stant communication and k-database (information theoretic) PIR can be
achieved with n
log log k
k log k communication. However, beside all those improve-
ments in communication and computation complexities of PIR protocols
there are still major problems remains. Most of the protocols which have
been proposed in academia are not practically implemented and not proper
to be used in real applications. For instance, we evaluated one of recent
works by Carlos Aguilar-melcho and Philippe Gaborit [20]. Their works was
a single-server lattice-based PIR scheme which uses matrices. We imple-
mented the protocol and evaluated it with various number of data. however
communication complexity in the scheme was not acceptable for practical
applications.
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3.4 Oblivious Transfer Protocol (OT)
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is an cryptographic primitive which can be consid-
ered as a two-way version of PIR protocol which means that none of the
sender and receiver can infer any information related the data except the
one that they have privilege access them. However, it cannot be considered
as an replacement for PIR because oblivious transfer imposes an additional
privacy requirement for the database, on the other hand, PIR requires com-
munication sub-linear in n, while oblivious transfer has no such necessity. In
this protocol, sender sends more than one encrypted data items to the re-
ceiver and receiver are able to decrypt only authorized data which is belong
to him/her. Therefore, sender could not figure out which data item has been
accessed by the user also receiver could not decrypt other data except the one
belong to him/her. Oblivious transfer protocol can be thought as an stronger
version of PIR because it not only provides users’ privacy against database
but also users cannot access other data except their own data. However,
depends on the application, we can decide whether we need two-way privacy
or not. In this thesis, database privacy is not considered as a crucial prob-
lem because the data stored in the database are public and everybody have
a privilege to access them. However, still it is feasible to use this protocol
instead of PIR protocol.
Oblivious Transfer (OT) Protocol was firstly introduced in 1981 by
Michael O. Rabin [29]. In his proposed model which was based on PSA
public key cryptosystem, the sender sends two messages to the receiver with
probability of 1
2
. Therefore both sender and receiver are remain oblivious
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to each other. The common and more useful oblivious transfer protocol
called 1-2 Oblivious Transfer or ”one out of two oblivious transfer” (OT 21 ).
It is introduced by S. Evan et al [8] in order to builds protocols for secure
multiparty computation. OT 21 protocol can be generalized to one-out-of-n
oblivious transfer protocol (OTN1 ) such a way that user can only obtain one of
there elements while database server are not able to infer which data element
accessed by the user. Claude Cre´peau [7] presented a proof those two (”one-
out-of-two”) notions are computationally equivalent. 1−n oblivious transfer
protocols were propsed by Moni Naor and Benny Pinkas [22], William Aiello
et al [1], Sven Laur and Helger Liomaa [18]. Later, Brassard, Cre´peau and
Robert have generalized this notion to k-n oblivious transfer protocol OTNk [2]
which means that k-out-of-n data items in database which have been sent
to the user are accessible by user. The protocol with k-out-of-n scheme
can be defined either non-adaptive or consecutively. Moni Naor and Benny
Pinkas [23] proposed a new method with O(N) computation complexity in
preprocessing stage and fixed computation (independent of k) complexity for
each new value the receiver obtains. Furthermore, OTNk protocol is a specified
version of Generalized oblivious transfer, which firstly was introduced by
Ishai and Kushilevitz [14]. Their works was based on parallel invocations
of OT 21 while making use of special model of private protocols. Afterwards,
other protocols have been proposed based on secret sharing. There are some
remarkable OT protocols which are working based on secret sharing were
published by Bhavani Shankar et al [32] and later Tamir Tassa [37] proposed
another scheme of the protocol.
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3.5 Oblivious Random Access Memory (ORAM)
Oblivious Random Access Memory (Oblivious RAM or ORAM) is third pro-
tocol of cryptographic primitive series to hide users’ access pattern or re-
quested data from curious database server. The concept introduced by Oded
Goldreich [12] and Rafail Ostrovsky [26], which enables a user, that can store
constant amount of data locally, and store the rest remotely on the server,
so that user can access the data item in the server while hiding the identities
of the items which are being accessed. In fact, ORAM protocol is mostly
devised to be used in a resource-restricted devices such as mobile phones.
However it can be also used for other purposes such as searching data on
encrypted data for preventing cache attacks or protection against any other
kind of privacy violation. Goldreich [12] investigated the ORAM protocol to
utilize it in software protection problem. The goal of his works was to hide
the access pattern of a software to main memory that is because of preventing
reverse engineering of the software. Later, Goldreich and Ostrovsky gener-
ated new model of ORAM for software protection [13] with the best result of
their works. In particular, each ORAM scheme should hide the following in-
formation from the server to provide users’ privacy against eavesdropper who
might be the server itself: (1) the location of the accessed data item in the
memory, (2) the order of data requests, and (3) the number of requests to the
same location. Furthermore, any possible types of access such as get-value,
set value, insert-new-item, delete-item, etc. must also be indistinguishable
to the server. Most of the presented ORAM schemes have provided accept-
able level of privacy for users, However, almost all of them are unfeasible to
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implement them in the real-world applications. For instance, the cost of the
best protocol of Goldreich-Ostrovsky [13] efficient but clearly unfeasible for
any reasonable application. Because for storing n data item there should be
O(n log n) memory available; furthermore, each access to a data item was re-
placed by O(log3 n) data requests to the stored data. Nonetheless, due to the
overwhelming overhead of the oblivious RAM protocol, it was often cited as a
theoretical solution which could solve many privacy related problem, however
it is apparently impractical to be used in real-world applications. Therefore,
some new works are there to make the protocol much practical and feasible
in order to make use of them in real-world applications. Benny Pinkas and
Tzachy Reinman [28], re-investigated the Oblivious RAM protocol which is
introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [13]. In their scheme, they improved
previous protocol to make it feasible in practice, also they described a new
construction with a considerably improved overhead therefore it requires the
client to store only O(n) items, and replace each data request with O(log2 n)
access to the data stored in the database. Although Pinkas and Reinman
improved ORAM protocol’s efficiency to make them more practical, still the
ORAM protocol was very costly and highly complicated to implement it in
practice. Nonetheless, there are other subbranches of ORAM protocol have
been introduced by other researchers. One of very appropriate protocols of
ORAM protocol family is Path Oblivious RAM protocol. Due to the impor-
tance of this protocol, we will discuss it thoroughly in the next section.
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3.6 Path Oblivious RAM
Path Oblivious RAM (Path ORAM) is introduced in 2012 by Emil Stefanov
et. al. [35] and it improved by them later in 2013 [36]. The advantages of the
protocol are that is highly simple to implement because, it can be described
by a few lines of pseudo-code also this protocol is very close to the goal
of ORAM protocol which was designed to be used in a resource-restricted
devices such as smart cards or smart phones. Namely, it is very practical to be
used in a devices with a small amount of storage capacity. They proved that
the protocol requires O(log2N/log x) bandwidth overhead for block size B =
x logN . Also Their protocol works better than best known ORAM scheme
for the block sizes bigger than ω(log2N). As we mentioned earlier, we need
a cryptographic scheme in order to use it in outsourced storage application
(in our works we are aiming to outsource identification and authentication
process of customers in the bank). However, in the outsourced storage, due
to the fact that data stored are publicly accessible, clients access can leak a
significant amount of sensitive information about the data through statistical
inference. Islam et. al. [15] proved that an adversary can infer as much as 80%
of the search queries of the users’ accesses to the encrypted email repository.
Stefanov el. al. [36] works proposes a new approach to the ORAM scheme,
which makes the following contributions:
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3.6.1 Simplicity and practical efficiency
Although there is no formal way of measuring its simplicity, it is apparently
obvious that their protocol is very simple with respect to any other previous
proposed ORAM protocols. The reason is that, we can describe the core of
the protocol in just 16 lines of pseudo-code (see Algorithm 1). Furthermore,
there is no need to perform an extra and sophisticated operations such as
oblivious sorting and oblivious cuckoo hash table construction like many
existing ORAM. In fact, each access to the server database in Path ORAM
scheme, can be expressed as simply fetching, shuﬄing, and storing a single
path in a tree stored remotely on the server. In addition, simple nature of
Path ORAM makes it more practical than any existing ORAM construction
with small local storage which can be constant or poly-logarithmic depends
on the applications being used.
3.6.2 Asymptotic efficiency
They also prove that, their proposed Path ORAM protocol can achieve
asymptotic bandwidth cost ofO(log2N / log x) blocks and consumesO(log2N/ log x)ω(1)
blocks in client-side storage, by taking to account that the size of blocks are
reasonably large (B = x logN bits where N in the total number of blocks)
by using recursion, where recursion is proposed in Shi et. al. [34]. Also they
claim that the above result achieves a failure probability of N−ω(1) which is
negligible with respect to the size of N . Emil Stefanov et. al. [35], compared
Most of well-known ORAM schemes in their work. They compared Asymp-
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totic bandwidth cost of their works with other well-known ORAM schemes
in Table 3.1.
ORAM Scheme
Client Storage Read
& Write Bandwidth
(# blocks of size B)
Read & Write Bandwidth
(# blocks of size B)
Kushilevitz et. al. [16]
B = Ω(logN)
O(1) O(log2N/log logN)
Gentry et. al. [10]
B = Ω(logN)
O(log2N).ω(1) O(log3N/log logN).ω(1)
Chung et. al. [6]
B = Ω(logN)
O(log2+(N)) O(log2N . log logN).ω(1)
Recursive Path ORAM
for small blocks. [35]
B = Ω(logN)
O(logN).ω(1) O(log2N)
Recursive Path ORAM
for moderately sized
blocks [36], (block size of
B = Θ(logN))
O(logN).ω(1) O(logN)
Table 3.1: Comparison of Emil Stefanov et. al. [35] proposed method with
other known ORAM schemes.
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3.6.3 Practical and theoretic impact of Path ORAM
As we pointed out earlier, first version of Path ORAM scheme introduced
by E. Stefanov et. al. in 2012, has made both a practical and a theoretic
impact in the users’ privacy and outsourcing topics. Due to the conceptual
simplicity it is more suitable to be implemented in resource-restricted devices
as well as hardware. An example simulation has been built by Ren et al.
[31] for secure processor architecture based on path ORAM algorithm and
the Ascend processor architecture introduced int 2012 by Fletcher [9] as a
primitive. Furthermore, there are several theoretic works adoptd the same
idea of eviction in their ORAM constructions. Gentry et al. [10] and Chung et
al. [6] tried to improve ORAM bounds based on the binary tree construction
by Shi et al. [34]
Path ORAM protocol is based upon the binary-tree ORAM framework
propsed by Shi et al. [34]. the protocol is designed to prevent untrustwor-
thy database server from accessing users’ access pattern or queries and the
data they requests which are very sensitive information. In this protocol,
assumption is that, a client has restricted processing as well as storage re-
sources. Therefore, our assumption is that the server is untrustworthy and
the client is trusted, including the client’s processor, memory, and disk. In
the following, we will explain Path ORAM protocol functionality in detail.
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3.6.4 Notation and Definition
We assume that the client fetches/stores data on the server in atomic units,
referred to blocks, of size B bits each. Also, throughout the document, we
will use N as the number of distinct data blocks that are stored in Path
ORAM. Table 3.2 indicates all notations required in Path ORAM protocol.
Notation Description
N Total number of blocks outsourced to server
L Height of binary tree
B Block size (in bits)
Z Capacity of each bucket (in blocks)
R Capacity of each block (in records)
P (x) Path from leaf node x to the root
P (x, l) The bucket at level l along the path P (x)
S Client’s local stash memory
Position Client’s local position map
x := Position[a]
Block a is currently associated with leaf node x, i.e.,
block a resides somewhere along P (x) or in the stash.
Table 3.2: Path ORAM Notations
3.6.5 Path ORAM Protocol Description
In Path ORAM scheme tree structure has been used to store data in server
side. Although, for the sake of simplicity, we use binary tree in our descrip-
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tion, it can be a tree with more than two children per node. However, our
implementation is fully parametric and it is possible to set the number of
children per node as well as other settings. For binary tree with the height
L there are 2L leaves in the tree. The levels of the tree are numbered 0 to
L where level 0 denotes the root of the tree and level L denotes the leaves.
It is possible to implement tree structure using either array or pointer (fixed
size v.s. dynamic size).
Each node in the tree is called a Bucket. Each bucket has a capacity of
Z real blocks. However, if there are less than Z blocks to store inside block,
it is padded with dummy blocks to always be of size Z. There is no such a
rule for size of bucket z or number of children per node, although it is better
to choose small size for bucket (e.g. Z = 4).
We have developed two separate program: 1) in-RAM and 2) mapped
to database. In the first implementation (in-RAM), each block contains R
number of records and each record contains users’ information fields such
as user ID, name, family, public key, etc. However, atomic access to the
database in both implementations is block which is similar to the proposed
protocol by Stefanov et. al. [36].
According to the authors of the Path ORAM protocol [36], x ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2L−
1} denotes the x-th leaf node in the tree. P (x) is a function which is being
used to denotes the all buckets along the path from leaf x to the root node of
the tree. In addition, P (x, l) is a function which denotes the bucket in P (x)
at level l in the tree. In other word, using function P (x), we can obtain all
buckets starting from leaf node x along the root, while using P (x, l) we refer
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to a certain node (bucket) of tree which is resides in level l and on the path of
leaf node x to the root. Furthermore, the size of the database (tree) depends
on the parameters: 1) tree height, number of children per node, number of
blocks per bucket, and number of records per block. Since there are about
N buckets (nodes) in the tree and each bucket contains Z blocks, also each
block contains R records, the total server storage is about Z.N blocks or
R.Z.N records.
3.6.6 Client Storage and Bandwidth
Client side in Path ORAM protocol consists of two separate data structure, a
stash memory and a position map. Followings sections describe these struc-
tures functionality in detail.
3.6.6.1 Stash Memory
Stash is a local memory of client to keep retrieved blocks from the server
temporarily. Furthermore, it can be used to store some blocks if there will
be no free space in the server (overflow in the buckets of tree). Thus, stash
S is used as a temporary memory space to keep blocks. They proved that
stash has a worst-case size of O(logN).ω(1) blocks with high probability.
Also they showed that the stash is usually empty after each Path ORAM
read/write operation complete.
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3.6.6.2 Position Map
The client uses position map to get leaf node number of the tree in such a way
that it can access to the block a which is stored in a bucket (node) along the
way from leaf node x to the root and we indicate it as x := Position[a] also
if is not in the tree i is stored in the stash memory temporarily. Therefore, it
is recommended to check stash before searching data on the tree or somehow
indicate it in the position map so that user can know whether block is in
stash or tree. In fact, position map is an array which maps block number to
the leaf node number of tree.
3.6.7 Path ORAM Initialization and Data I/O
Initially, database tree has been generated in server side with encrypted
random dummy blocks. Respectively, In client side, Stash is empty and
position map is set with independent random numbers between 0 and 2L −
1. Basically, all data transaction operation such as read, write, update,
and delete is done via single protocol called “Access” which is described in
Algorithm 1. In fact there are to separate operations: Read and Write. to
read block a, client calls data ← Acess(read, a,None) and to write data∗
to block a the client performs Access(write, a,Data∗). Emil Stefanov et.
al. [36] summarized Path ORAM scheme in 4 main steps as follow.
1. Remap Block (Lines 1 to 2): Randomly remap the position of block
a to a new random position. Let x denote the block’s old position.
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2. Read Whole Path (Lines 3 to 5): Read the path P (x) containing
block a.
3. Update Block (Lines 6 to 9): If access is write (new record, edit
record, and delete record), update the data stored for block a.
4. Write Path (Lines 10 to 15): Write the path back and possibly include
some additional blocks from the stash if there is any vacant place in
the database tree.
Algorithm 1: Path Oblivious RAM Algorithm
Function Access (op, a, data∗)
x← position [a]
position [a] ← uniformRandom(0...2L − 1)
for i ← 0, 1, ..., L do
S ← S ∪ ReadBucket(P(x, l))
data ← ReadBlock a from S
if op = write then
S ← (S −{(a, data)}) ∪ {(a, data∗)}
for l ← L downto 0 do
S ′ ← {(a′, data′) ∈ S : P(x, l) = P(position [a′], l)}
S ′ ← Select Min(|S ′|, Z) Blocks from S ′
S ← S − S ′
WriteBucket(P(x, l), S ′)
return data
Chapter 4
Proposed Study: Path
Oblivious-RAM Based Public
Key Repository
We use Path ORAM protocol to achieve the goal of hiding users’ requests
against untrustworthy outsourced database server. However, due to the fact
that information, which is being stored at server side is in relational database
structure, clients should send their requests in a form of SQL command to the
server. Therefore, we should either change request commands at client side
to Path ORAM protocol data request format, or somehow convert users’
requests to path ORAM protocol request. In the first approach, perform-
ing significant modifications at client side software and data structure are
inevitable. Nevertheless, such modifications are costly and require consider-
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able configuration changes. As a result, it is essential to find another solution
in order to tackle this issue.
In this study, we developed a model in which the client queries are ob-
tained in regular SQL format and then parsed so that it can be processed via
Path ORAM protocol. In our model, a position map is kept for each search
key. After SQL parsing, we decide on which buckets are to be retrieved start-
ing which leave nodes. Moreover, in our model we developed an adaptation
layer between Path ORAM’s tree structure and a relational database so that
the buckets are stored and retrieved from relational database. Now, we are
going to explain our model in more detail.
Figure 4.1: First Step of our proposed method (Client Request).
Client side operations are shown in Figure 4.1. Client first passes SQL
command to the parser. SQL command parser is a function that takes a
SQL command as an input and after analyzing returns a list of records that
client requested. Then this information is sent to the position map to get
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leaf nodes indices of all requested records. Finally, these leaf nodes indices
are sent to the server with Path ORAM data structure to fetch records form
data server.
A requirement of aforementioned approach is that, each data transfor-
mation between client and server changes the leaf node index of requested
record. Therefore, it is essential to use a flag for fetched records then it is
possible to infer whether the record has already been fetched or not.
Next phase of data fetch operation is being run at the server side. After
receiving requested data from a client, server should operate the request.
However, storing data structure of Path ORAM at the server side has its
own challenges. Owing to the fact that Path ORAM uses tree data structure
to store data records, we need to generate tree structure in the server side.
Although, generation and management of the tree structure using an object
oriented languages is fast and not considered a hard task, enterprises do not
prefer to change their institutional database infrastructures to have extra
security and privacy services. In this respect, Path ORAM’s nonstandard
tree data structure is a disadvantage in its entirety. In our system, we address
this problem by adapting Path ORAM’s tree data structure into a relational
database.
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Figure 4.2: Second Step of our proposed method (Server Response).
Figure 4.2 gives an overview of our proposed method of storing and
retrieving data by the use of relational database management system. As
represented in Figure 4.2, as soon as server receives the requests from client
side (leaf nodes indexes), it maps the requested data into a corresponding
SQL command. Then, this generated SQL command is sent to the relational
database system in order to fetch requested records. Note that, generated
SQL command at the server side is not the same with the one provided by
the client in the first step of the operation. SQL command of the first step
is what the user aimed to retrieve from the data server; however, the second
one is the SQL command which is generated by the mapper function in order
to fetch those information from Path ORAM tree, which is mapped into a
relational database management system. Finally, all requested data (a path
starting from a leaf node through root node) are sent back to the client as a
result of its request.
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4.1 Parsing SQL Command into a Path ORAM
Data Request
In this section, we discuss client side parser process in detail. As we discussed
in the previous section of this chapter, clients uses relational database data
request command (SQL Command) in order to send it to the server. This
SQL command, in turn, needs to be transformed into a Path ORAM data
request. For this purpose, we developed a flexible parser so it can parse any
complex queries.
Figure 4.3: Sample tree data structure with 7 records.
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Algorithm 2: SQL query to Path ORAM data request parser.
H Function Parser (SqlExp)
pSqlExp← parenthesize(SqlExp)
Stack ← toPostfix(pSqlExp)
LeaveNodesList← Empty
Condition← pop(Stack)
LeaveNodesList← readPosMapList(Condition)
while Stack 6= Empty do
Condition← pop(Stack)
lst← readPosMapList(Condition)
Operator ← pop(Stack)
if Operator = AND then
LeaveNodesList← LeaveNodesList ∩ lst
if Operator = OR then
LeaveNodesList← LeaveNodesList ∪ lst
Return LeaveNodesList
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Table 4.1: Records information stored in the tree.
ID Name Family Leaf
index
ID Name Family Leaf
index
R1 N1 F1 3 R8 N2 F3 1
R2 N2 F3 1 R9 N3 F3 2
R3 N3 F1 1 R10 N1 F1 2
R4 N1 F2 2 R11 N2 F3 3
R5 N2 F2 4 R12 N3 F1 3
R6 N3 F2 3 R13 N1 F2 4
R7 N1 F3 1 R14 N2 F3 4
Algorithm 2 describes steps of operations to parse SQL command into
a leave nodes lists. In the first step of the algorithm, SQL expression is paren-
thesized according to prioritized order of evaluation and then is converted
into postfix notation to be stored in a stack. Note that, priority of the opera-
tions are controlled by postfix expression evaluation using stack. After that,
we made a loop over stack data and in each iteration of the loop, condition
and operator are popped from the stack. For each condition, we retrieve a
list of corresponding leave nodes (lst) by looking up from the position tables.
If the operator is AND, current leave nodes list is the intersection of the
current one and lst. If the operator is OR, then the current leave nodes list
is the union of current one and lst. These steps apply to all elements inside
stack and after loop finishes, the list called LeaveNodesList contains the leave
nodes indices which meets all conditions in the SQL query.
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Following is a sample run of a parser method in client side applied on
the tree given in Figure 4.3. The database field values and the leaf node
indices are given in the table 4.1.
We exemplify using two queries given below.
1. SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE ID = R6
2. SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE (Name = N2) AND (Family = F3)
Query 1 is a single query that returns a simple record. For such single queries,
we just need to find it in position map and get leaf node index of that record.
Query 1 resulted in a single record with ID = R6 and the leaf node index
to access this record is 3. On the other hand, query 2 returns more than
one record. According to our parser, we should fetch leave nodes indices
for the first condition Name = N2 which are 1, 3, 4. In the second step of
the algorithm, we obtain the leaf node indices of the second condition of
the query which are 1, 2, 3, 4. Finally, since AND operator is used in this
complex query, we should obtain a list of leave nodes indices by applying
intersection on those two lists, so the resulted list becomes 1, 3, 4.
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4.2 Mapping Path ORAM data structure into
relational database
In this section, we explain how Path ORAM tree data structure is mapped
into a relational database system. In order to map the data structure of
Path ORAM (tree) into a relational database system, we use some relational
database tables and SQL queries.
4.2.1 User Data Table
This table contains records of users. Maximum number of records that we can
store in this table is the capacity of records in the corresponding Path ORAM
tree. In order to associate the user records to Path ORAM’s structure, we
use BlockID as the primary key of the table. This field is also the foreign
key of the Path ORAM mapping table, which will be explained in the next
subsection.
Other fields of this table are the actual user database’s fields, which
vary application-wise.
4.2.2 Path ORAM Mapping Table
In order to map a tree data structure which is used by Path ORAM protocol
into a relational database system, we need to devise a mechanism using tables
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and relations between tables. We generated two tables, one for storing user
information, which is explained in the previous subsection, and the other one
to keep tree structure information such as Block ID, bucket ID (tree node
ID) and leaf node index. Theses two tables has a one to one relation us-
ing BlockID as a primary key in the user information table and foreign key
in mapping table. After generating inner-joined table, fetching all records
which belong to a specific leaf node is reduced to a simple SQL query. The
following SQL commands are the inner-join and a sample information fetch
commands, respectively.
- Inner-join SQL command:
SELECT tblMapping.*, tblPathOram.* FROM tblMapping
INNER JOIN tblPathOram
ON tblMapping.BlockID = tblPathOram.BlockID
- Sample SQL command to fetch a path with leaf node index i:
SELECT * FROM tblInnerJoined WHERE LeafNodeIndex = i
Chapter 5
Performance Evaluation
In this chapter, we evaluate efficiency of our work in order to use it as a public
database but preserving users’ privacy. Users send their SQL-Like queries to
the remote database server and server returns corresponding results for each
query of each user. We used Path ORAM protocol in order to provide users’
privacy in the database, but database design and implementation details
are hidden from users. Users just send out normal SQL-like queries. The
queries first parsed into leaf node indices of Path ORAM and they are sent
to the database server. Then, database server fetches them from the mapped
relational database.
Our server specifications and the details of development environment
are as follows.
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• CPU: Intel R©, CoreTM, i7-2600 @ 3.40 GHz, 64-Bit
• RAM: 8 GB DDR3
• Ethernet: 100 Mbps
• H.D.D.: 700 GB
• OS: MS Windows 10 Professional, 64-Bit
• Programming Language: MS Visual C#.NET 2015
• Database System: MS SQL Server 2014
5.1 Communication Models
In our experiments, we used three different communication models between
clients and server.
• Database in the RAM: In this model, entire database has been
generated and stored locally in the RAM. There is no network since
client and server are running in the same machine. The goal of this
setup is to evaluate performance of our system for the cases where
all overheads are reduced. In other words, this model gives the pure
computational cost of our proposed system. Moreover, in this model
database is stored using native Path ORAM tree structure.
• Crossover Link: In this model, client and server machines are sep-
arated and connected directly via an ethernet cable. In other words,
database is stored in the server and the client is connected to send
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queries over this crossover cable. In this model, network delays are
almost zero. This model is useful to apply our proposed adaptation
layers to Path ORAM, but the communication overhead is minimized
to see the real computational performance. In this model, SQL parsing
and relational database adaptation layers are fully integrated.
• LAN Connection: In this communication model, the server and
client machines are separated, as in crossover cable model. Moreover,
all adaptation layers are integrated as well. The only difference be-
tween this setup and the crossover connection setup is that, clients and
server are connected over LAN instead of direct connection in order to
take into account possible network traffic delays.
5.2 Databases Used in Tests
The databases that we use in our performance tests are synthetically gener-
ated. We use a sample database structure with six fields. Table 5.1 shows
the fields and data type of each fields of the database.
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Table 5.1: Fields of database table used in our experiments.
Field Name Data Type Primary Key Is Unique
ID String Yes Yes
Public Key BigInteger No Yes
Name String No No
Family String No No
Email String No Yes
City String No No
Because of memory restriction in the RAM, we are enforced to use
relatively less amount of records for ”Database in RAM” communication
model as compared to other communication models, in which database is
stored on disk as a relational database.
We have generated five different databases using the same table format,
but with different number of records by applying different settings to Path
ORAM tree. In all generated databases for the network based models, there
are two children per node and 25 blocks per bucket. However, the height of
tree varies to generate various number of records. Table 5.2 indicates various
tree heights and respective numbers of generated records for network based
communication models. Here, the database is mapped into MS-SQL Server
2014 database system.
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Table 5.2: Database sizes used (for network based models).
Tree Height
Total # of Records
Generated
11 102,375
12 204,775
13 409,575
14 819,175
15 1,638,375
We also generate databases to be used in RAM. This one is a pure
Path ORAM tree data structure and not mapped to relational database
model. However, because of the memory restrictions of RAM, the number of
generated records is smaller than the other models. All in-RAM databases
have two children per node and 20 blocks per bucket, but with different tree
heights in order to generate various numbers of records. Table 5.3 shows
different settings of generated in-RAM databases with respective number of
generated records for each tree height.
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Table 5.3: Database sizes used (for in-RAM database).
Tree Height
Total # of Records
Generated
9 20,460
10 40,940
11 81,900
12 163,820
13 327,660
5.3 Query types tested
For each setup, we executed four different queries as follows:
• Query 1: SELECT * FROM db.tbl WHERE ID = ’12’. This query has
a result of single record, because the ID is unique and is the primary
key of the table. This query is used to evaluate single record fetch
time. Moreover, this is the most common query type in the transaction
signing scenario, which is the main motivation of the project.
• Query 2: SELECT * FROM db.tbl WHERE Email = ’EAAAAB@US.COM’.
This query’s result is also one record, because email address is also
unique for each user among table records.
• Query 3: SELECT * FROM db.tbl WHERE (Name = ’NAAAAB’
AND Family = ’FAAAAC’). This query results in more than one record.
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The number of fetched records depends on the repetitions of field val-
ues in the database. This type of complex query is not a typical one
for transaction signing application; it can only be used for system ad-
ministrations for some advanced oﬄine tests and applications.
• Query 4: SELECT * FROM db.tbl WHERE (Name = ’NAAAAB’
AND City = ’CAAAAB’) OR (Family = ’FAAAAB’ AND City =
’CAAAAC’). This query also returns more than one record and it is
more complicated than Query 3 in term of conditions because there
are combinations of AND & OR operators. As Query 3, this one is
also not typical one, but can be needed for some advanced oﬄine tests.
5.4 Record Fetch Timing Analyses
Figure 5.1 shows Query 1 fetch timings for both crossover and LAN connec-
tion models. As shown in this figure, for a database with 100, 000 records,
end to end latency of sending the query and getting the response takes less
than one second for crossover connection; 1.6 seconds in LAN connection
model. As the number of records increases, latency also increases linearly. It
takes 3.1 and 4.0 seconds for crossover and LAN connection, respectively, in
a database with 1, 600, 000 records.
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Figure 5.1: Record fetch timings of Query 1 (crossover and LAN connection
modes)
Figure 5.2 depicts Query 2 fetch timings in both crossover and LAN
connection models. As seen in this figure, record fetch timings are almost
similar with the ones of Query 1. The reason for this is that both queries
result in single record. Owing to the fact that, we need to fetch public key
of the users which is also a unique among all stored records in transaction
signing application, this kind of single record fetch queries is of utmost im-
portance regarding the timings.
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Figure 5.2: Record fetch timings of Query 2 (crossover and LAN connection
modes)
Table 5.4: Number of fetched records in the on-disk databases.
# of Records in Database
Query
No.
102,375 204,775 409,575 819,175 1,638,375
3 2 4 8 20 31
4 6 9 27 51 81
Figure 5.3 shows Query 3 fetch timings for both crossover and LAN
connection models. This query is more complex than Queries 1 and 2 and
returns more than one record. Consequently, it takes greater time than the
Record Fetch Timing Analyses 54
previous two queries. As the number of records increases in the database,
the number of fetched records also increases (the numbers of fetched records
for Queries 3 and 4 are shown in Table 5.4). This, in turn, causes several
database accesses for various paths. For instance, record fetch time for the
database with 100, 000 records takes less than 5 seconds in crossover connec-
tion, while it takes 47 seconds in crossover connection and 100 seconds in
LAN connection for a database with 1, 600, 000 records.
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Figure 5.3: Record fetch timings of Query 3 (crossover and LAN connection
modes)
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Figure 5.4: Record fetch timings of Query 4 (crossover and LAN connection
modes)
Query 4 timings are shown in Figure 5.4. This query is the most com-
plex one among all other queries; consequently, it returns greatest number
of records as compared to other tested queries. As result, this query takes
higher fetch time than the other queries. Although these timings are high,
since this type of complex queries are not directly used in transaction signing
applications, the total duration of transaction signing is not affected directly.
This type of complex queries would be used for some oﬄine analyses only.
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Figure 5.5: Record fetch timings for in-RAM database model - all queries
Figure 5.5 shows all queries’ timing result for the model in which the
database is stored in RAM as a tree. Because of the storage capacity re-
striction of main memory, we generated databases up to almost 327, 000
records. The goal of this test is to obtain computational cost for the case
where the costs of communications and relational database/SQL adaptation
are reduced. Queries that return single record take between 10 and 20 mil-
liseconds, while more complex queries take up to 100 seconds. As discussed
earlier, complex queries are not commonly used ones in real world applica-
tions. Since the flow of transaction signing requires single record queries and
the computational cost of these queries, with the costs of communication and
adaptation reduced, is below 100 milliseconds even for a database with one
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million records (due to linear increase in Figure 5.5), we can conclude that
the additional cost of Path ORAM-based privacy enhancing techniques is at
marginal level.
Figure 5.6 and 5.7 give the timings of 4 queries altogether for crossover
and LAN connection models.
We also evaluate response time of the four separate queries with almost
fixed number of records (around 440, 000), but with different Path ORAM
tree database settings such as tree height, number of children per node, and
number of blocks (Record) per bucket (tree node). The results are given in
Table 5.5. As shown in the this table, the time needed to fetch a single record
from a database with almost 440, 000 records is approximately one second
(Queries 1 and 2). However, it is also clear that the height of tree has an
effect on the data fetch time; the greater the tree height, the grater the fetch
time for both Queries 1 and 2.
Record Fetch Timing Analyses 58
1 2 4 8 16
x 105
10−1
100
101
102
103
All Queries Retrieval Time using Crossover Connection
# of records in the database
tim
e 
ta
ke
n 
(se
co
nd
s)
 
 
Query 4
Query 3
Query 2
Query 1
Figure 5.6: Record fetch timings for crossover connection model - all queries
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Figure 5.7: Record fetch timings for LAN connection model - all queries
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Table 5.5: Effect of tree parameters
Tree
Height
# of
Child
Blocks /
Bucket
# of
Records
Fetch time (for
all records
returned via
crossover
connection)
(Sec.)
Query
No.
# of
records
returned
13 2 25 409600 1.279 1 1
9 3 14 413336 0.889 1 1
8 4 5 436905 0.81 1 1
7 5 5 488282 0.724 1 1
13 2 25 409600 1.395 2 1
9 3 14 413336 0.922 2 1
8 4 5 436905 0.856 2 1
7 5 5 488282 0.881 2 1
13 2 25 409600 7.268 3 8
9 3 14 413336 5.502 3 9
8 4 5 436905 3.067 3 7
7 5 5 488282 3.564 3 8
13 2 25 409600 68.154 4 27
9 3 14 413336 37.796 4 24
8 4 5 436905 18.340 4 21
7 5 5 488282 27.391 4 31
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As seen in Table 5.5, the fetch times of Queries 3 and 4 are relatively
higher than other queries since these queries return several records and each
record fetch needs a separate access to the database in Path ORAM. More-
over, the determining effect at the tree height is also seen for Queries 3 and
4.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we designed and developed a proof of concept solution for the
problem of customer database outsourcing for a bank to be used in trans-
action verification problem. In this model, the bank needs to query the
customers’ public keys in a secure and privacy preserving manner. Our so-
lution is purely based on an existing privacy preserving data access model,
namely Path ORAM [35,36]; however, we developed end user/system adap-
tation layers in order to hide the non-standard features of Path ORAM from
the client (the bank in our use case) and the server (the cloud provider). Such
an abstraction is, actually, a must for a practical system since the enterprises
do not prefer to change their workflows and infrastructures for extra security
and privacy.
In our model, we get regular SQL queries from the client side and all
user data is kept in a relational database model at the server side. The
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SQL queries are first parsed according to Path ORAM requirements and the
records are fetched from the relational database via its natural language.
Thus, the end systems do not see any details of Path ORAM and its non-
standard features.
We also performed extensive performance analyses in order to under-
stand the feasibility of such an approach. We have seen that the computa-
tional overhead of end-to-end query processing, when used for transaction
verification to return single record, is around 2 seconds per million records in
the database. One should remark that this timing is with a regular computer
used as a server; with high capacity server systems, this latency could easily
be reduced.
Thus, we conclude that the idea of using Path ORAM to keep user data
in outsourced databases in a privacy preserving manner is viable for financial
transaction verification applications.
As future work, the adaptation layers that we developed for SQL and
relational databases can be redeveloped for NoSQL databases.
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